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Abstract
In most industrial countries, while the calculation of pension benets is
progressive, public pension systems redistribute weakly from high to low-
income earners. They are close to actuarial fairness. This statement results
from the following specicity: less paid jobs are also heavier and health-
damaging jobs involving losses in life expectancy. As avoiding low earnings
and hard-working conditions require acquisition of skills, we study conjointly
in this article the impact of social security and the work-related life ex-
pectancy loss on the schooling decision. We then study macroeconomic and
distributional consequences of global gain in life expectancy associated with
di¤erent social security reforms, focusing particularly on spillover e¤ects pos-
sibly generated by education.
Keywords: social security, human capital, inequality
JEL classication: H55, J31, D63
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1 Introduction
In 1950, life expectancy at birth in Western Europe was 68 years. Nowadays,
it is 80 years and should reach 85 years in 2050 (United Nations, 2009).
However joyful, such a tendency is also associated with a serious threat that
is hanging over the nancing of our public retirement systems. Indeed, the
latter are nanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, i.e. pension benets are
paid through contributions of contemporary workers. Hence, they must cope
with the increasingly larger number of pensioners compared to the number
of contributors. In France for example, the ratio of old (aged 60 years and
over) to active people (aged 17 to 59 years), the demographic dependency
ratio, should reach 66% in 2050 whereas it was 36% in 2005 (see Figure 1).
Changes are unavoidable. If we want to guarantee in the near future the
current level of benets within the same system, it will be necessary either
to increase the contribution rate or the length of contribution (by delaying
the age of retirement).
Such a potential increase of the Social Security burden has called into
question the role of PAYG retirement systems in our societies. By reducing
savings in the economy, some economists claim that the latter are ine¢ cient
and harm the nancing of the whole economy. By evaluating the real pre-
tax return on non-nancial corporate capital at 9.3%1 and the growth rate
over the same period (1960 to 1995) at 2.6%, Feldstein unequivocally advo-
cates the privatisation of retirement schemes and the change to fully funded
schemes. He thus assesses the potential present-value gain to nearly $20
1This return combines prots before all federal, state, and local taxes with the net
interest paid. The method of calculation is described in Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks-
Mireaux (1983).
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Figure 1: Demographic dependency ratio (age 60+ over age 17-60, source:
United Nations, 2009, and authorcalculation).
trillion for the United States.
To lower the forecasted increase of the Social Security burden and to
preserve the existence of the public retirement systems, delaying the legal
age of retirement has been privileged throughout industrialized countries.
For example, Starting from 65 years, Australia and Germany have decided
to postpone the legal age of retirement of 2 years, the UK of 3 years. In
France which has one of the most generous retirement system, the legal age
has been postponing in 2010 from 60 to 62 years. However, such a decision
has been very conicting, lots of people perceiving it as unfair. Unskilled
workers having entered the labor market early, they argue indeed that they
should continue to retire at 60 years. In addition, as their life expectancy is
lower than skilled workers (see Table 1), increasing their working life appears
actually on this point particularly unfair: they contribute longer to enjoy a
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less long retirement.
Managers Manual Workers
1991 2003 change 1991 2003 change
Life expectancy (age 60) 21.1 23 +1.9 18 19 +1
Compared with average +1.9 +2.2 +0.3 -1.2 -1.8 -0.6
Table 1. Life expectancy at age 60 by occupational group in the French
male population (number of years; source: Cambois et al., 2001, and Cambois
et al., 2008, based on data from INSEE).
Analysed only under the contribution length and the time spent in re-
tirement, retirement systems appear signicantly regressive. Nevertheless,
one can also observe that most pension benet formulas are progressive,
especially in Anglo-Saxon countries where pensions are weakly related to
earnings (see OECD, 2007). When taking into account this progressivity,
studies stress then (Burkhauser and Walick, 1981, and Garrett, 1995, Gust-
man and Steinmeier, 2001, Coronado et al., 1999, 2000, Brown et al., 2006)
that most retirement systems in the industrial world are in fact close to ac-
tuarial fairness2 (see Stahlberg, 1990, for the Swedish system, Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2001, and Brown et al., 2006, for the American system). De-
laying the retirement age for most workers except for unskilled ones is then
not so fair from an actuarial perspective. In addition, a large increase of the
Social Security progressivity is not necessarily in the advantage of the low-
income earners. Indeed, by increasing the progressivity, this policy tends
2Strictly speaking, a retirement system is said actuarially fair if its return is equal
to the interest rate (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Cigno, 2008). Considering that the
economic growth rate, which is the retirement system return, is lower than the interest
rate, retirement systems could be described more properly as quasi-actuarial fair as noted
by Lindbeck and Persson (2003).
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to reduce the incentive to invest in education to become a skilled worker.
Considering that education can generate strong knowledge spillovers which
have a positive inuence on productivity (see Rauch, 1993, Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2000, Moretti, 2004), reducing the private investment in education
through an increase of the social security progressivity can then turn out
harmfull for low-income earners. Investigating social security reforms must
then cope with dimensions like progressivity, actuarial fairness, work peni-
bility and the induced loss in life expectancy, investment in human capital,
earnings inequality, productivity and savings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
model which is a version of the Ben-Porath model (1967). In section 3, we
then study the impact of aging if no reform is implemented such as all the
ajustement corresponds to an increase of the social security size. In section
4, compared to this baseline, we analyse the consequences of two alternative
reforms: either delaying the legal age of retirement of 2 years or increasing
the contribution years for the same duration but only for skilled workers. In
the last section, we briey conclude.
2 The Model
The model is an extended version of the Ben-Porath model (1967) in the
spirit of Cahuc and Michel (1995) and Le Garrec (2011). Individuals live
for two periods: they are respectively young and old. They work in both
periods. Potentially the entire rst period, but only a share l of the second
period. After, they are retired during   l  0, where  represents longevity,
  1. At each date, there is a constant number of young people normalized
to one.
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2.1 Individuals
When young in t, individuals are endowed with initial knowledge character-
ized by a human capital htit. They can enter directly the job market. If
they do so, following Lilliard (1977), Andolfatto et al. (2000) and Huggett
et al. (2006), we will assume that their earnings prole is at and then that
their human capital when old stays equal to htit. By contrast, before entering
the job market they can make en e¤ort et = 1 and continue school dur-
ing a period z in order to increase their human capital when young such as
htit(eit = 1) = 
H
y h
t
it, where 
H
y > 1. In addition, we will assume that skilled
workers continue to increase their knowledge during their professional activ-
ity: htit+1(eit = 1) = 
H
o h
t
it, where 
H
o > 
H
y . The latter will have then an
increasing earnings prole, Hy w then 
H
o w, as highlighted by Lilliard (1977),
Andolfatto et al. (2000) and Huggett et al. (2006).
Preferences of an individual born in t are described by the following utility
function:
U = ln cit +  [i ln dit+1 + ln (i   li)]  "ieit (1)
where cit denotes the consumption when young, dit+1 the consumption when
old,  the discount factor; "i denotes the utility cost of complementary school-
ing e¤ort and represents learning ability. In particular, a talented child char-
acterized by "i = 0 endures no cost in making the e¤ort. By contrast, a lazy
or untalented child characterized by "i !1 will endure an innite cost and
will then always choose not to make the e¤ort, i.e. et 1 = 0.
Earnings heterogeneity can arise in this setting with di¤erent initial hu-
man capital or with di¤erent learning ability. However, as shown by Huggett
et al. (2006), when individuals di¤er only in their initial human capital en-
dowment, the model generates a counterfactual pattern regarding the US
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earnings distribution. By contrast, they show that the US earnings distri-
bution can be replicated quite well when considering di¤erences in learning
ability across individuals3. Accordingly, we then assume that "i is distributed
over the population according to a Pareto distribution P ("min; ) while each
individual is endowed with the same initial human capital normalized to 1,
htit = 1 8i8t.
During their rst period of life, individuals consume a part of their dis-
posable income, and save such as:
cit + sit = (1   t) (1  zeit)htit (eit)wt (2)
where sit denotes the savings, wt the wage index, and  t the contribution
rate, eit = f0; 1g.
In the second life period, individuals continue to work during a period li
and therefore are retired the remaining i   li. They get back the savings
lent to rms with interest, receive their pension from the public retirement
system and consume their wealth. The budget constraint is then:
idit+1 = (1   t+1)htit+1 (eit)wt+1li +Rt+1sit+1 + (i   li) pit+1 (3)
where Rt+1 denotes the interest factor, and pit+1 the pension benets.
3Stating that earnings are very signicantly tied to the earnings of the parents (Bowles
and Gintis, 2002, dAddio, 2007), this suggests that the intergenerational earnings per-
sistence is based on the inheritability of learning ability within families. Supporting such
a view, education is a major contributor to intergenerational earnings mobility and edu-
cational di¤erences tend to persist across generations (dAddio, 2007). Nevertheless, as
shown by Bowles and Gintis (2002), it does not imply that the intergenerational earnings
determination is only based on genetic transmission. Learning ability also reects non-
cognitive personality traits such as, for example, a taste for learning at school which can
be inuenced by the family background as much as by the genes.
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The maximization of the utility (1) subject to the budgetary constraints
(2) and (3) leads to the following saving function:
sit = (1   t) (1  zeit)htitwt  

it
1 + i
(4)
where
it = (1   t) (1  zeit)htit (eit)wit+(1   t+1) li h
t
it+1(eit)wt+1
Rt+1
+(i   li) pit+1Rt+1
denotes the lifetime income. By reducing at the same time the disposable
income and the need for future income, private savings is reduced by the
existence of a retirement system.
An individual chooses to make the e¤ort for complementary schooling if
it entails a utility benet higher than the utility cost associated with the
e¤ort, i.e. if
"i  ln
"

Ht
1 + H
1+H 
1 + L

Lt
1+L
(Rt+1)
(H L) 
H   lH
L   lL
#
= Xt
(5)
where 
Ht denotes the lifetime income of a skilled worker and 

L
t the lifetime
income of an unskilled worker. Assuming that "i  P ("min; ), it follows that
the proportion of individuals who choose to make the e¤ort in t to become
skilled workers is dened, in the case of an interior solution, by:
et = 1 

"min
Xt

(6)
where det
dXt
> 0. The structure of skills in the economy is thus determined by
the life cycle welfare inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The
higher this inequality, the larger the proportion of individuals incited to be
trained.
Traditionally, working decisions are also determined by utility maximiza-
tion. However, one can note that retirement ages are signicantly linked to
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the age at which pensions become available, the legal or normal age of re-
tirement (see Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998; Gruber and Wise, 1999). First,
workers, especially low-income earners, can not leave the labor force without
having any pensions. Second, continuation in the labor force after this age
means forgoing pension benets but also paying pension contributions with a
little or no increase in benets after retirement. As a consequence, in OECD
countries, the implicit tax on continued labor force participation earnings af-
ter pensionable age amounts to 50 to 80 per cent. The legal age of retirement
provides then a strong incentive to leave the labor force at this specic age.
For example, in 1983 the legal age of retirement in France came from age 65
to 60. Shortly after, the modal age of retirement became 60 whereas it was 65
in the early 1970s. As a shortcut, to avoid modellizing explicitly the implicit
tax on continued labor force participation earnings after pensionable age, we
then assume that workers, at least unskilled workers, leave the labor force at
the legal age of retirement. In the calibrated version of the model, we will
then determine the skilled workersage of retirement in order to reproduce
the average age of retirement in the population.
2.2 The retirement system
Retirement systems have pay-as-you-go features, i.e. within one period,
pensions are nanced by contributions of workers of the same period. In
other words, retirement systems transfer workersincome towards pension-
ers. Knowing that workers are either skilled or unskilled, the social security
balanced budget is dened as follows:
Z
i
pitdi =
h
LyHt 
H
y + L
yL
t + L
oH
t 
H
o + L
oL
t
i
 twt (7)
where Ljt denotes the number of worker of type j in t, j = L;H.
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The calculation of pension benets is specic to each country, and some-
times can be very complex. In the theoretical literature on social security4,
two di¤erent parts are generally distinguished: a redistributive part (the
Beveridgean part) characterized by a basic at-rate benet, and an insur-
ance part (the Bismarckian part) characterized by earnings-related benets.
The latter is not generally proportional to all contributions and then not
based on full lifetime average earnings (see OECD, 2007). It is particularly
the case in Greece and Spain where benets are only linked to nal salary.
It also used to be the case in Sweden before the 1994 legislation introducing
NDC systems. In France, before the Balladur reform of 1993, earnings-related
benets were linked to the ten best years, then gradually to the 25 best years
after the reform. In the United States, the 35 best years are considered to
calculate the benets, 20 in Norway.
Following Michel and Pestieau (2000), we assume that the representative
earnings on which benets are linked are the earnings when old. Assuming
that the basic at-rate benet is based on the contemporary wage of unskilled
workers5, the calculation of pension benets for any worker in t is then given
by:
pit = t
 
1 + eit 1
H
o

wt + twt (8)
where t represents the size of the at-rate component of the pension benets
and t the size of the earnings-related component.
Consistently with Table 1, the pension benet formula (8) is progressive.
Indeed, when considering an unskilled worker, eit 1 = 0, the gross replace-
4See Casamatta et al. (2000), Docquier and Paddison (2003), Sommacal (2006), Cremer
et al. (2007), Hachon (2010), Le Garrec (2011).
5It is designed to ensure that pensioners achieve some minimum standard of living.
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ment rate6 is p
L
t
wt
= t + t while it is
pLt
Ho wt
= t +
t
Ho
when considering a
skilled worker, eit 1 = 1. Nevertheless, as noted in the introduction, most
retirement systems of industrialized economies are close to actuarial fairness.
In terms of the retirement system implicit return, i.e. the ratio between the
pension benets received by an individual and the actualized amount of his
contributions, this means that:
 
L   lL pLt
 t 1wt 1 +  tlL wtRt

 
H   lH pHt
(1  z)  t 1Hy wt 1 +  tlHHo wtRt
(9)
If (
L lL)pLt
 t 1wt 1+ tlL
wt
Rt
>
(H lH)pHt
(1 z) t 1Hy wt 1+ tlHHo wtRt
, then the retirement system
is scally favorable to low-income earners. In this case the system is progres-
sive. In the opposite case, it is regressive even if the pension benet formula
appears progressive. In this setting, the existence of an actuarially fair re-
tirement system is not straightforward. Indeed, if we consider that educated
workers cotisate less long (they enter the job market later) and benet of
the pension for longer (they live longer), even a pure at-rate system can
be regressive if, at steady state, 
H lH
L lL >
(1 z)Hy + l
HHo
R
1+ l
L
R
. On the other hand,
assuming that skilled workers live longer while they leave the job market at
similar ages, and have a steeper lifetime income prole, as explained by Lind-
beck and Persson (2003), Bozio and Piketty (2008), and Le Garrec (2011), is
su¢ cient to assert that a pure earnings-related system based on best or last
years is regressive. An actuarially fair retirement system can then exist only
if a pure at-rate system is progressive and if a pure earnings-related system
is regressive, i.e. if
(1 z)
H
y
Ho
+ l
H
R
1+ l
L
R
 H lH
L lL 
(1 z)Hy + l
HHo
R
1+ l
L
R
.
6Dened following the United Nations (2007) as the pension benet divided by gross
pre-retirement earnings, as in Table 1.
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2.3 Firms
We consider a competitive sector characterized by a representative rm pro-
ducing a good, which can be either consumed or invested, according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology with constant return to scale:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = AtK

t (Lt)
1  ; 0 <  < 1; (10)
where Yt denotes the output, Kt the physical capital stock, Lt = L
yL
t +L
oL
t +
Hy L
yH
t + 
H
o L
oH
t the labor supply in e¢ ciency units, and At the total factor
productivity.
Denoting per capita e¢ cient capital by kt = KtLt and assuming a total
capital depreciation, the optimal conditions resulting from the maximization
of the prot are:
Rt = Atk
 1
t (11)
wt = At (1  ) kt (12)
As fully documented in economics (see for example Mincer, 1993, 1997),
the investment in education of an individual has a positive impact on his
earnings. From a social perspective, education can also generate knowledge
spillovers which have a positive inuence on productivity and then on earn-
ings (see Rauch, 1993, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Moretti, 2004). We
therefore assume that the productivity (and earnings) is positively linked to
the proportion of educated individuals in the economy such as:
At = ~A

et + et 1
2

(13)
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At steady state, earnings of a worker i is equal to hi(ei) ~Ae (1  ) k.
Moretti (2004) has then estimated that the elasticity  of earnings with
respect to the proportion of educated workers is robustly estimated between
0:6 and 1:2.
2.4 General equilibrium
The economy is composed of four markets corresponding to the young un-
skilled labor, the old unskilled labor, the young skilled labor, the old skilled
labor, the capital and the good. In a closed-economy setting, general equi-
librium can be then obtained by considering the simultaneous clearing of the
following markets:
young unskilled labor:
LyLt = 1  et, 8t; (14)
old unskilled labor:
LoLt = (1  et 1) lL, 8t; (15)
young skilled labor:
LyHt = (1  z) et, 8t; (16)
old skilled labor:
LoHt = et 1l
H , 8t; (17)
and capital:
Kt+1 = ets
H
t + (1  et) sLt , 8t: (18)
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From (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18), we can then verify consistently with
the Walras law that the good market also clears.
3 Rising longevity with unchanged pension
benet calculation
3.1 Life expectancy and education: a simple case
Consider a simplied conguration with lH = lL = 0 and H = L = . In
this case, with (8) and (9) we can show that an actuarially fair retirement
system whose components are  and , 8t, is characterized by the following
at-rate share in the pension benet calculation:

 + 
=
Ho   (1  z)Hy
Ho   1
(19)
In this simple framework, the at-rate share in the pension benet calcula-
tion is increasing with the education length of high-skilled workers,
@ 
+
@z
> 0
and with the slope of their earnings,
@ 
+
@
Ho
Hy
> 0. In the more general setting,
it would be also determined by the length in retirement and then by the
mortality di¤erential between high and low-skilled workers. We also note
that the share (19) is independent of the longevity . With an unchanged
pension benet calculation, a retirement system which was actuarially fair
stays actuarially fair when considering a rising longevity7.
Considering an actuarially fair retirement system, the education decision
characterized by (5) and (6) becomes:
7It is not necessarily the case if there exists a mortality di¤erential. Indeed, if the latter
stays unchanged in terms of years, a global rising longevity decreases the relative mortality
di¤erence and then necessarily the at-rate share in the pension benet calculation.
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et = 1 
"min
X

, 8t (20)
where X = (1 + ) ln

(1  z)Hy

. From (20), we can deduce that the
proportion of high-skilled workers jumps directly on its steady state level as
soon as the (unforcasted) variation of longevity is known. From (20), it also
follows that:
Proposition 1 If lH = lL = 0 and H = L = , an actuarially fair retire-
ment system has no impact on the education decision.
Starting from proposition 1, we can deduce that a progressive system will
lower the incentive to invest in schooling and then the proportion of skilled
workers. Besides, if education generates knowledge spillovers (Moretti, 2004,
Rauch, 1993), a progressive system can reduce the global productivity in the
economy. By contrast, a regressive system could enhance productivity and
be benecial even for unskilled workers by increasing their market earnings.
Proposition 2 If lH = lL = 0 and H = L = , a rising longevity when
considering an actuarially fair retirement system increases the investment in
schooling.
The positive relation between life expectancy and education has been
well documented in the literature8. As increased longevity raises the value of
investments that pay over time, it rst increases the return to initial invest-
ment in education. In addition, it increases the e¤ective discount factor 
8See de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Boucekkine et al.
(2002), Cervellati and Sunde (2005, 2011), Soares (2005), Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney
(2009). Challenging the conventional wisdom, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) nd no e¤ect
of life expectancy on schooling.
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which favors savings and investment (see de la Croix, 2009, for an overview
of the theories). For an economy with high life expectancy, Kalemli-Ozcan et
al. (2000) have hence estimated the elasticity of schooling years with respect
to life expectancy to 0:7. As an actuarially fair retirement system has no
impact on the education decision (Proposition 1), the relation between life
expectancy and investment in schooling stays unchanged in our simplied
version of the model irrespective of the size of the retirement system.
Considering (20), the budget balance of the pension system, obtained
with (7), (8), (14), (15), (16) and (17), is dened as:
 t =  ( + ) , 8t (21)
With eqs. (4), (11), (12), (18) (20) and (21), the dynamics of the model
can then be summarized as:
kt+1 =
 [1   ( + )]Ae (1  )
 (1 + ) +  ( + ) (1  ) k

t (22)
As  < 1, given k0 > 09, the model has the good dynamic proper-
ties and converges towards the unique steady state characterized by k =h
[1 (+)]Ae(1 )
(1+)+(+)(1 )
i 1
1 
and then, following (11), by the interest rate:
R =
 (1 + ) +  ( + ) (1  )
 [1   ( + )] (1  ) (23)
The interest rate does not depend on productivity and then on the social
return to education . On the one hand, a higher productivity increases the
demand for capital and then generates pressure on the interest rate. On the
other hand, a higher productivity increases earnings of workers and then favor
private savings. These two e¤ects compensate each other and the interest
rate stay unchanged with productivity variations.
9Or more exactly K0 which is the only predetermined variable in the model.
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Proposition 3 If lH = lL = 0 and H = L = , an increase of the size of
an actuarial fair retirement system, everything else being equal, increases the
interest rate.
This e¤ect is well documented in the literature (Feldstein, 1976). By
reducing the need for income when retired, an increase of the pension benets
reduces private savings. As a consequence, the interest rate increases.
Proposition 4 If lH = lL = 0 and H = L = , considering an actuarially
fair retirement system with an unchanged pension benet calculation, a rising
longevity increases the interest rate only if  +  >
p
(2+)2+4 1 

 (2+)
2 1 

.
The e¤ect of a rising longevity on the interest rate appears complex. On
the one hand, increasing the time spent in retirement increases the need for
future income and then private savings. If there is no retirement system, the
interest rate decreases. However if there is a su¢ ciently generous retirement
system, this incentive is lowered. In addition, such a generous system is
associated with a signicant increase of the contribution rate to fulll its
budget balance. If the pension benets are su¢ ciently high, a rising longevity
increases then the interest rate. Considering this complexity, and the fact
that heavy work and its negative impact on longevity is central in the social
security debate, we now consider the impact of the rising longevity on a
calibrate version of the entire model as describe in the previous section.
3.2 Calibration
Let us calibrate the model on the French economy for the mid-2000ies. Con-
sider rst that high-school dropouts, who represent 30% of the population
(Eurostat), enter the labor force at age 17 and leave it at the legal age of 60.
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Assuming that a period of life represents 36 years, it follows that lL = 7
36
.
Stating that the average retirement age (in the private sector) is equal to
61:3, we set lL = 8:9
36
. In addition, assuming that high-school dropouts life
expectancy at age 60 corresponds to the one of manual workers, i.e. 19 years
(INSEE, see Table 1), having the life expectancy of the total population at
20:8 years entails a di¤erence of longevity between workers of 2:5 years. Get-
ting the demographic dependency ratio of 36% in 2005 in France (United
Nations, 2009, see Figure 1) corresponds then to the following longevity:
H = 23:2
36
and L = 20:7
36
. Observing that the average schooling time is equal
to 16:1 years in 2005 (UNESCO), we then set z = 7:3
36
. In 2006, we can ob-
serve that the wage of an unskilled worker (manual worker) represents 73%
of the average wage.
In 2005, the size of the retirement system corresponds to 13:2% of the
GDP (Eurostat, 2009). In addition, following the OECD (2007), the gross
replacement rate of low-income earners (those who earn 50% less than the
average) is equal to 63:8% while the gross replacement rate of those who
earn 50% more than the average is equal to 46:9%. In our model, we then
want to be close to a progressivity of the pension formula apprehended by
the following ratio: +
+ 
Ho
= 63:8
46:9
= 1:36.
Finally, as usual, we set the capitalshare in outpout  to 0:3, and we
calibrate the model in order to get an initial annual interest rate equal to
2:8%10 which corresponds to the long term average over the period 1971-
2004 in Europe (Banque de France; see Mésonnier, 2005). In addition, we
10Considering a period of 36 years, an annual interest rate of 2:8% corresponds to an
interest factor of R = (1:029)36 = 2:8 for the period.
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normalize A = 1 and we then set ~A =
8>>><>>>:
1
1:239
1:534
if  = 0
if  = 0:6
if  = 1:2
. Calibration is
summarized in Table 2.
Target data model Parameters
legal age of retirement 60 60 lL = 7
36
average age of retirement
(private sector)
61:3 61:3 lH = 8:9
36
longevity di¤erential 2:5 years 2:5 L = H   2:5
36
Demographic dependancy ratio 36% 36% H = 23:2
36
average schooling time 16:1 years 16:1 z = 7:3
36
high-school dropout rate 30% 30% "min = 0:146626
Unskilled workerswage
(% of average wage)
73% 73%  = 2:718
Pension formula progressivity 1:36 1:36  = 22:9%
Actuarial fairness  = 36:4%
social security size (% of GDP) 13:2% 13:2% Hy = 1:440
Ho = 1:757
Capitals share in output 0:3 0:3  = 0:3
Annual interest rate 2:8% 2:81%  = 0:55
Table 2. Calibrated values.
3.3 A baseline scenario
Regarding the initial equilibrium, consider a rising longevity (in t = 0) such
as H = 1 and L = 33:5
36
, i.e. with an unchanged mortality di¤erential
corresponding to 2:5 years. Such a scenario corresponds to a rise of the
demographic dependancy ratio from 36% to 66%, i.e. consistent with the
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forcasted rise in France from 2005 to 2050 (see Figure 1). In such a scenario,
the workers to pensioners dependency ratio increases by 33%, going from
36% to 69% (Fig. 2a). With an unchanged pension benet calculation, i.e.
 = 22:9% and  = 36:4%, the rising longevity leads to an increase of the
social security size from 13:2% to 25:2% of the GDP (Fig. 2b). The relative
rise of +91% of the economic dependancy ratio generates in this baseline
scenario an equivalent relative rise of the social security size as highlighted
by the average social security balanced budget  = RD  p
w
when considering
an unchanged gross replacement rate p
w
.
As stressed in the simplied version, in a generous system as in France,
the rise of the social security size is the unsurprisingly dominant e¤ect con-
sidering the evolution of the interest rate (Fig. 2c). As private savings is
lowered, the interest rate increases from an annual rate of 2:81% to 3:04% at
steady state. As already noted, the interest rate does not depend on the pro-
ductivity At. However, as longevity rises, the return to investment in human
capital increases and the average schooling time increases of a maximum of 8
months if the social return to education is at its maximum11, i.e.  = 1:2, of
approximatively 7 months and 6 months respectively for  = 0:6 and  = 0
(Fig. 2d). Everything else being equal, such a variation corresponds to an
increase of the proportion of skilled workers of 7:5% to 9:5% starting from
70%. If the social return to education is strong ( = 1:2), we can then
observe a non monotonic evolution of the interest rate. Indeed, in such a
11We have also calibrated "min and  such as the average school years increases at a
maximum of 8 months. Indeed, following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) the elasticity of
schooling years with respect to life expectancy for an economy with high life expectancy
is 0:7. Knowing that in France life expectancy should increase from 81.2 years in 2005 to
86 years in 2050, i.e. 5:9%, the average schooling years should increase in 2050 of 4:1%
and reach 16.7 years, i.e. an increase of 8 months compared to 2005.
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Figure 2: Rising longevity with unchanged gross replacement rates
case an increase of the proportion of skilled workers generates a productiv-
ity boost and then an increase of the demand for capital. The interest rate
rst increases then decreases towards its stationary level. By contrast, if the
social return to education is zero, the interest rate increases monotonously
towards its stationary level.
From a social perspective, the welfare change of the low-income earners
is crucial (Fig. 2f). For the rst generation enjoying the rising longevity,
the impact is similar to a free lunch. They have to cotisate more during a
very limited period of time (equal to lL) to enjoy a longer retired life with
unchanged pension benets. Considering the other generations, their welfare
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change depends crucially on the social return to education (Fig. 2e). If
the latter is zero, the welfare of the low-income earners decreases despite
the rising longevity. It is obviously due to the rise of the social security
size. The return of a PAYG retirement system corresponds to the wage bill
growth. At steady state, with no population growth it means that the return
is zero. In this context, the rising longevity means at steady state both an
increase of the size and of the (relative) ine¢ ciency of the PAYG retirement
system (compared to private savings). As the market income of workers is
positively related to productivity whatever their skill, this negative e¤ect can
be reduced if productivity is enhanced by an increase in the human capital
investment. We can therefore observe on Figure 2f that if the social return
to education is strong ( = 1:2), the net wage and the welfare of low-income
earners can slightly increase in the long term with the rising longevity.
In the baseline scenario, we consider the impact of the rising longevity
with unchanged pension benets and retirement age. Di¤erent types of re-
form can be analysed with respect to this baseline: the progressivity of the
pension benet formula, the decrease of the benets or the postponing of the
retirement age. Observing that the latter is the privileged reform in most
countries, we investigate in what follows its economic and distributional con-
sequences
4 Delaying the retirement age
In most OECD countries, the legal age of retirement is 65 (and is currently
increasing as in Australia, Germany, the UK and Denmark). In France, it
used to be age 60. France has one of the most generous system both in
terms of pension benets and age of retirement. The current debate over
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the retirement system in France is then unsurprisingly strongly related to
the age of retirement. In October 2010, it has been voted to delay the latter
from age 60 to 62. However, from a social perspective, it has raised the
debate of education and heavy work. As high-income earners cotisate less
long (because of their longer schooling time) and live longer, it has been
supported that such a uniform delay of the retirement age is unfair for low-
income earners. In the following, we then investigate both a uniform delay
of the retirement age, and a delay supporting only by high-income earners,
i.e. skilled workers.
4.1 The legal retirement age
Delaying the legal age of retirement from age 60 to 62, assuming that it
increases the e¤ective age of retirement of two years for both skilled and un-
skilled workers, has benecial e¤ects at least on two aspects. First and obvi-
ously, such a reform decreases the dependancy ratio. Thereafter, it decreases
the required social security size from 25% to 22% to maintain unchanged
the pension benets, i.e. a decrease of 3% compared to the baseline (Fig.
3b). Second, as the length of the working life is signicantly increased, the
private return to schooling is increased and the average school time increases
of more than two months compared to the baseline, irrespective of the social
return to education (Fig. 3d). Everything else being equal, such an increase
corresponds to an increase of the skilled workersproportion of 2:8% com-
pared to the baseline. Therefore, if the social return to education is not zero,
productivity is enhanced. In addition, as private savings is predetermined,
an increase of the labor force rst increases the interest rate compared to the
baseline, then decreases it driven by a lower social security size (Fig. 3c). At
steady state, we can then observe that delaying the legal age of retirement
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Figure 3: Increasing the legal age of retirement of 2 years (w.r.t. the baseline)
increases the net wage and then the welfare of low-income earners all the
more that the social return to education is high (Figs. 3e and 3f).
Delaying the legal age of retirement has nevertheless one major disadvan-
tage. The welfare of the rst old low-income earners generation decreases
from 0:5% ( = 0) to 0:9% ( = 1:2) compared to the baseline (Fig. 3f).
This observation stresses the political and social di¢ culty to implement such
a reform. The latter strengthens the feeling that the system is not fair con-
sidering mostly the longevity loss associated with the hard work conditions.
Some therefore claim that the delay of retirement age should be supported
only by skilled workers.
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4.2 Taking into account hard work conditions
As unskilled workers enters the job market before skilled workers and as
they live less long, letting them retiring at age 60 while skilled workers should
contribute two years more compared to the baseline can appear at rst glance
fairly justied. Compared to a uniform increase of the retirement age, such a
reform of course reduces the decrease of the dependancy ratio and then of the
social security size. However, the main impact is not there. With unchanged
gross replacement rates, the system becomes strongly progressive and favors
low-income earners. Such a reform lowers then the incentives to be trained.
It results in a drop in the average schooling time from 8 months ( = 0) to
11 months ( = 1:2) compared to the baseline (Fig 4d), or equivalently to a
drop in the skilled workersproportion of respectively almost 10% to more
than 13%.
If the social return to education is zero, it has no impact on productiv-
ity and both the net wage and the welfare of low-income earners increases
compared to the baseline (Figs. 4e and 4f). In addition, we can note that
the welfare of low-income earners in the long term equals their welfare when
they have to delay their retirement of 2 years. However, it does not decrease
the rst generations welfare. It stresses in this case the political facility in
implementing such a reform. Nevertheless, considering that the social re-
turn to education is between 0:6 and 1:2 gives opposite results. For the rst
old generation of low-income earners, the loss of welfare compared with the
baseline is slightly higher. More important is the e¤ect for future low-income
earners. The drop in productivity resulting from the drop in skilled workers
proportion would lead to a decrease of 5% to 16% of their welfare whereas
it would have increased of 4% to 5:9% if they have delayed their retirement
age of two years. In such a conguration, the postponement of the legal age
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Figure 4: Increasing the skilled workerscontribution length of 2 years (w.r.t.
the baseline)
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of retirement of two years is then better than letting unskilled workers still
retiring at age 60, even for the latter
5 Conclusion
As a fact, population in the industrialized countries is aging. The threat
associated with that is hanging over the nancing of our public retirement
systems can not be ignored. Changes are unavoidable. To lower the for-
casted increase of the Social Security burden and to preserve the existence of
the public retirement systems, delaying the legal age of retirement has been
privileged in most countries. In France the legal age has been postponed in
2010 from age 60 to 62. However, such a decision has been very conicting,
lots of people seeing it as unfair. Unskilled workers having entered the labor
market early, they argue indeed that they should continue to retire at age 60.
In addition, as their life expectancy is lower than skilled workers, increasing
their working life appears actually on this point particularly unfair: they
cotisate longer to enjoy a less long retirement. In this article, we analyse
the consequences of two alternative reforms: either delaying the legal age of
retirement of 2 years or increasing the contribution years for the same dura-
tion but only for skilled workers. We then show that the choice of the best
reform considering low-income earners depends crucially of the social return
to education. If the latter equals zero, the most socially preferable reform
corresponds to letting unskilled workers retiring at age 60. By contrast, if the
social return to education is as estimated by Moretti (2004), the most socially
preferable reform corresponds to a delay of the legal age of retirement.
In the present article, we have analysed a delay of two years in the age
of retirement as chosen by the French government. However, regarding the
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aging process characterized by the increase of the dependancy ratio as illus-
trated in Figure 1, one can only deduce one thing: this reform is only a rst
step and the legal age of retirement should be delayed to at least age 65 at
the half century, and even more if following other OECD countries.
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